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A noted theologian and long-time member of the Linacre Quarterly editorial
advisory board, Father Connery has taught at Loyola Uni versity of Chicago,
and has served as advisor to the National Conference of Catholic Bishops
in Washington.

Claire Conroy was an 84-year old nursing home res ident who suffered
from serious and irreversible physical and mental impairments. At the most,
she had about a yea r to live, but she would die wi thin a short time if a
nasogastric tube, through which she was being fed , were removed . She was
able to respond "somehow" , although only in a minimal way. But she would
not be classified either as comatose or in a persistent vegetati ve state, much
less as brain-dead . The questi on that was raised had to do with the removal
of the nasogastric tube. Wo uld this be permissible?

Legal Solution
The legality of removing the tube was tested in the New Jersey courts.
The trial court decided to permit its removal on the g ro unds that Ms.
Conroy's life had become ' ' impossibly and permanently burdensome·· and
th~t ~~r " intellectual function had bee n permanentl y red uced to a very
Pnmntv~ level.'' Briefly , it was a quality-of-life judgme nt . It was not based
f~1 the ktnd of burden or benefit offered, but on the quality of the patient' s
e apart from the treatment .
th The guardian ad litem appealed the case and the Appellate Court ruled
t at removing the tube would be tantamount to killing the woman. According
_othe court, the right to terminate life-sustai ning treatment was limited to
~ncurable and terminally ill patients who are brain-dead. irreversibly comatose
; vegetative, who would get no benefit fro m treatme nt . Briefl y. the
:.llate Court did not depart from the quality-of-life approach but simply
Wi~~ that the quality-of-I_ife of ~s. Conroy was sufficientl y low to ~~rrant
rawal of tubal feedmg. Smce she could respond '"somehow , her
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quality-of-life was above that of t~e br~in-dead_, ~rreversibly cc
presistently vegetative, so tubal feedmg (hfe-sustammg treatment)
required.
· ·
f
The Supreme Court of New Jersey o~ert~med the dec1s1_on o t
Court and set up a triple test for termmatmg treatment ~n such
with these tests that we are concerned. The general bas~s f~r tl
Court decision was a common law right to self-d~te~mmat10 n
of any human being. The cou~t recogni~ed that th1s nght was r
but would yield to a compelling state mterest.

.tose or
legally
pellate
es . It is
upreme
the part
tbsolute

Moral Solution
The court had no doubt that Ms. Conroy, if competent, ~aul d
to have the nasogastric tube removed. The present quest1on a ;
she was not competent. How does one decide in such cases whet.
may be terminated? The Supreme Court proposed three _test ~
these decisions for the incompetent. The cou~t w~s dealmg '
from the viewpoint of law. Our concern here IS w1th the mo r.
of the case and the tests in question. Although not unrelated , the
two different dimensions and they should not b~ confused , so I
to examine these tests from a moral perspective .
.

e chosen
because
reatment
· making
the case
1mension
re indeed
mportant
1

Subjective Test
The first test the court proposed, which it called a subjec
that it be clear that the patient would have refused treatrr. r
circumstances of the case. The court enumerated several ~c<
in which the patient (when competent) might have made her mt
If it was clear that she would have refused treatment, no furthc1
be necessary.

test, was
under the
1a ble ways
on known .
-ting would

Consent and Morality
.
b h h
,. c the patient
From a moral perspective, there IS no dou t t at t e consel " ' Of itself,
is a requirement for the withdrawal of treatment (or non-tr~atn . rt r) ._ thdrawal
however, such consent would not have b~en ~ufficient to JU ~t! I:. ~; her life .
or non-treatment. The patien~ ha~ a~ o~hgatJOn to preserve ht., the atient.
Although this obligation has Its hmits, It m~st be respected h)w ith!rawing
And it would be morally wrong for the patient to consent to .
legallY
treatment if such an obligation were present. The fact that It was
permissible would not chan~e this.
. .
. self moraiiY
So even if there is clear evidence of consent, It Will ?ot of It
t as well
justify the withdrawal of treatment. This is ~rue of the Jncon:pete~he proxY
as the competent patient. In the case of th~ mcompetent pau~~~ented , but
must assure himself not only that the patient wou ld h~ve c ld cooperate
also that it was morally permissible to do so , befo re e cou
322
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in any decision-making about withdrawing treatment. Without this assurance
he would have a moral obligation to remove himself from the case.
The court indeed recognized that the right of self-determination is not
absolute but is limited, even legally , by a compelling state interest. It
enumerates four such interests: preserving life, preventing suicide, safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession , and protecting innocent
third parties. At the same time, however, the Court states that ordinarily
these interests will not foreclose a competent person from declining lifesustaini ng medical treatment for himself. Presumably, the same would be
true of an incompetent patient if the conditions of the first test were met.
This makes one wonder whether compelling state interests will cover the
whole moral obligation. Certainly the fact that there is clear evidence of
the patient's refusal of treatment will not of itself justify the cooperation
of a proxy in withdrawing treatment. As already mentioned. he would also
have to be sure that it was morally permissible to withdraw treatment before
he could give his consent. So, whatever the legality of the decision, meeting
the requirements of the first test would not be enough for a moral judgment
about withdrawing treatment.

Limited-Objective Test
The Conroy decision calls for other testing only when it is not clear that
the patient would have refused treatment. In this event it requires what it
classifies as a limited-objective test. This test demands that there be some
evidence that the patient would have refused treatment. but also requires
t~at the decision-maker be satisfied that the burdens of the patient's continued
h~e with the treatment outweigh the benefits of that life for him. It elucidates
th1s norm further. asserting that the patient is suffering. and. will continue
to suffer throughout the expected duration of his life, unavoidable pain,
a~d that the net burdens of his prolonged life (the pain and suffering of
hJs life with the treatment less the amount and duration of pair• the patient
would likely experience if the treatment were withdrawn) markedly outweigh
any physical pleasure. emotional enjoyment or intellectual satisfaction that
the patient may still be able to derive from life .

Burden And Consent
From a moral viewpoint we must also raise a few questions about this

lest. We have already pointed out that even clear consent on the part of

the· ·Patient would not of itselfJ·ustify
te
· withdrawing treatment without further
Sling. Here we have to ask whether such testing can supply uncertainty
consent. In other words, will the fact that a treatment is very
~rdensome automatically remove doubt about consent to withdrawing it.
e do not think so . We say this because even if a particular treatment is
~ery burdensome and. therefore. morally optional. the patient may still warit
1
-and many patients do. All an analysis of the burdens and benefits of

~bout
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a treatment shows is that it would be morally permissible c
patient to have it withdrawn. In itself, it gives u~ n~ as.:.ur~nce o
The fact that it is burdensome might be more mdtcattve o l
to have it withdrawn if the alternative was not legitimate . r
he may legitimately request treatment, clarity of intention will n•
by showing that refusing treatment w~:>Ul~ be burde~some a
permissible. And if his intention remams m doubt , the bene t.
should be in favor of preserving life and treatment.

it for the
imention.
intention
~ long as
achieved
herefore.
the doubt

Consent and the Incompetent
Discerning the wishes of the patient is undoubtedly di ffi•
when the
· .th e wts
· h es o 1 :rson who
patient is incompetent. How do~s. one d eter~me
is incompetent? If the person anttctpated the sttuatton whe~ he
mpetent.
he might have made his wishes sufficiently clear. But tf he . not , what
can be done? Perhaps the best approach in this event is t~ pt .e the best
interests of the patient. If it is in the best interests of a patten , terminate
treatment in these circumstances, there is reason to believe th ~ey~esent
patient would do likewise . It may be helpful to discern whe t!
tt ts m the
best interests of the patient by examining the decisions com . .: nt people
make in analogous cases . If competent people generally re1
treatment
..
t'
th;r \competent
in these cases , one can make a Iegtttmate presump ton
.
uall
patients would also do so . On the other hand, if competent p:. nts us
~
continue treatment, the presumption wou.ld )Je that incompetent I ~tents w~~ve
also do so . Such presumptions would remforce whatever ev tdc e may
been present of the patient 's own intention. Although not as rc .t leas ~~~ar
evidence of the patient's intentions , it will be suffici~nt to '":a rr ' ~~ a dect~~n
to withdraw treatment in a case where no better evtdence ts ll\ ,ulable. . ~
process clearly offers a stronger basis for assuming the consent •Jf the pa:ten
than a simple judgment that it would be markedly burdensome and . there ore.
could be legitimatdy withdrawn.

1

Quality of Life vs. Quality of Treatment
.
· ·
· If TraditionallY·
The second question has to do wtth the objeCttve test ttse ·
ke
moral theologians have admitted that one would not be obliged to ta of
treatment which would be excessively burdensome or ~ffer no :o~~ent
benefit. The test speaks of the. burdens~~ the continued. h fe of thas~essing
with treatment. The difference ts that tradtttOnally theologtans were . tude
· · seems to me
the burdens of treatment as such . T h e present d ectstOn
trnent
the burdens of the patient's life. If these burdens are the effect of the tread nt to
·
· ·d B ·f th y a re antece e
as such , the two approaches will comet e. ~t t
e
t includes a
the treatment and therefore , independent of tt, the court te
f
the
uality-of-life
di~ension.
Conceivably,
the
burde
n
result!ng.
lr~ernediM·
q
.
·b· t' or aru fic ta t'
treatment might be minimal, e.g ., ta.k mg an antt to tc, .
reatrnent.
over a short period of time, the maJor burdens antecedmg the t
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For all practical purposes, what the decision is saying is that the burden
?fthe person's life itself may be such that there is no obligation to preserve
It even by means which are only minimally burdensome in themselves or
the~r e~fects. Traditionally , everyone, even the most handicapped, had no
obhgat10n to preserve life by treatment which would be effective without
being too burdensome . The test departs from the traditional moral norm
in this respect.
The decision disclaims any intention of allowing withdrawal of treatment
based on personal worth or the social utility of another's life , or the value
of that life to others. Insofar as the decision rules out the social utility of
another's ~ife or the value of that life to others, it is being consistent with
the norm tt has set down. But it seems contradictory to rule out personal
~orth.as a criterion and , at the same time, include the patient's quality-ofhfe Wtth treatment. It is not easy to see the difference between the two.
If the court saw a difference, it should have pointed it out.

Burden, Benefit and Proportion
The traditional moral approach did not call for the kind of comparative
assessment the present test calls for. The duty to prolong life was determined
~y the burdens o_r the benefits of a particular treatment , not by a balancing
f the two. Obv10usly , no normal person would choose pain or any other
burden unless some good was to be derived from doing so , but there was
no ~?raJ requirement to measure the burdens against the benefits. In the
tradtttonal approach, if the pain or other burdens were excessive, whatever
the benefits of the treatment, it became optional. To demand such a balancing
would. be to expect too much of most patients.
baJBest~es making th~ process itself very difficult , the requirement of
th ancmg burdens agat.nst benefits could ~ead to. much more rigid conclusions
an anyone would wtsh. Such conclustons did not surface in the Conroy
case or ·m other court cases, since the concern was whether and to what
~:te~t the burdens of the patie.nt's life .with t~eatment outweighed the benefits.
out m the ~e~?ert cas~ (Ca!tf.) the Judge m the Court of Appeals pointed
be tthe pos~tbthty that tf a treatment offered " significant benefit", it would
. proportiOnate (and presumably obligatory) even if it were extremely
:•~ful. In the t.radit~onal approach , whi!e the fact that ~ t~eatment would
. ery beneficial might have been constdered a factor m mterpreting the
Wtshes of an incompetent patient, it would not have made it obligatory. If
::ea~ment caused excessive. pain, it ~ould not be obligatory even if it was
ecttve. As we shall see , m the thtrd test, the New Jersey Court itself
=~ed to depart from the balancing requirement in d;aling with treatment
IC would prolong a life of pain that would be inhumane.
theA:nal questi~n ~ust be raised about a tendency in the decision to define
IIIUchurdens of ltfe .m ter~s o.f pain. T.he traditional moral approach was
.broader. Bestdes pam , It would mclude other hardships- cost , or
111
Ytlung else the patient would consider burdensome. It may be that the
ember, 1985
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court was not limiting itself to phys ical pain but inte nd.ed. to incli : mental
pain , anxiety, privation, etc. But if the intention wa~ t~ limit legal · .hdrawal
to cases of severe phys ical pain , it was more restnct1 ve than a n al norm
would require.

Pure-Objective Test
lf th ere is no evidence that the patient would have dec lined
a third , pure-objecti ve test must be passed. Under thi s test, the
of the patient 's life with treatme nt should cl e~ rl y and marked!
the benefits that the patient de ri ves from li fe . Further , th\
unavo idab le and severe pain of the patient 's li fe w ith treatmer
such that the effect of ad ministe ring li fe-sustaini ng treatme1
inhumane .
The fi rst pa rt of the objecti ve requirement of thi s test dol
perceptibly from the objecti ve requirement of ~h e s~con d
di stingui shes this test is the requirement that the pam ~f li fe "'
be such that the effec t of further treatment would be mhu ma•
decision is saying is that if the pain of further treatme.nt would l
it wo uld be legall y permiss ible to forego it even w ithout an;
consent on the part of the patient .

catment.
burdens
mtweigh
~ c urring .

hould be
,vould be
Jot differ
st. What
treatment
What the
nhumane.
idence of

When Does Pain Become Inhumane?
This third test has the adva ntage over the second test of n· mg it look
reasonabl e (i f its conditions could be fulfilled) to conclude t consent 1 ~
withdraw treatment. One can legitimately pres ume that no rea~· tble pat~en
. . conclusiOn
would want treatment that would be .mhuma ne. W e sa1'd th at sue
could not safely be draw n from th e fact that t he b ur dens. v\ L:, great.hor
that they even outbalanced the be nefits. The key question in 11s test then
. of pam
· ma ke the efTL .., 0 f furl
is the following: When does the seventy
. er
d
.
I
d
.
h'
h
t
ded
I
'ti
l
contmue
treatment inhumane? The test me u es pam w IC an ece
.
. e
5 
th rough) treatment. not simpl y th e pai n related to treat~en t <t'. : uc h,- e/i~~
we have already dealt with the proble m~ related to a q.uah~~ -ot !1t~e cn\olely
we will not discuss that aspect of the third test. We will a sse ~" •11 L: test . .
01
· from hc· ·seventy
in regard to the inhumaneness of treatment ste mmmg
.
of
· h um<t. nc, hy
the pain . When do the effects of treatment become m
· reason
th e severity of the pain?
.
.
. . . wn sake .
e
No normal human being des ires or conse nts to pam fo1 Its 0 .
111
. arY
Ordinarily the reason that makes pain tolerabl e for the ·l1l d'' " 1'd. ua• 1 IS SO
good to be achieved. He or she is w illing to put up with the pa l1l n e ce~s om
to achieve that good . The person is not will ing to to lerate pam apart rore
achiev ing some desired good: he o r she is not will ing t~ tolera te any n~ict
pain than is necessary to achiev~ thi s good. ~t would be I ~hum,anea~~ '~n an
such pain on an indi vidual. So It could be mh um anc to Infl ic t P
indi vidual even apart from its severity.
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Even if pain is assoc iated with some good , the human being does not
automatically accept it. He. or she wi ll accept the pai n only if he or she
wishes the good. If the good is something which is obligato ry, e.g. ,
preserving life , and to the extent that it is, he or she must accept the pain
associated with it. However , the duty to preserve li fe is itself limited by
the degree of pain assoc iated with the means to do so . If the pain of treatment
is excessive, the person's obligation of li fe ceases in regard to that treatment.
But the desire to preserve one's li fe may go beyo nd his or her duty . The
person may therefore be willing to accept whatever pain is assoc ia ted with
achieving his or her desire. And if the desi re is there, any pain associated
with achieving it would not be considered inhumane. It would be inhumane
to inflict pain relating to preservi ng li fe only if it we nt beyond the person's
wishes. So , bas ically, it woul d be inhu mane to inflict pain witho ut some
benefit. It would also be inhumane to inflict pain beyond the wishes of the
patient even if some optional good was to be achieved. But the questi on
at issue is whether inflicting pain can be considered inhumane by reason
of its severity , etc. In other words, give n some good to be achieved and
the wishes of the patient to obtain th at good, would it be inhuma ne to do
so by reason of the severity of th e pain in volved?
The assumption underlyi ng the th ird test seems to be that this could happen.
What is not clear is whether it is say ing that it can he inhumane by reason
of severity, no matter what the good to be achieved, or whether it i.s say ing
that it can be inhumane because it is un reasonable in reference to the actual
good to be achieved (i n thi s case , the quality-of- life to be achieved).
Theologians would have disc ussed this in terms of the morality of lifepreserving treatment rath er th an its humaneness . They did ad mit that there
were limits to what one mig ht do to preserve li fe. It would be immoral,
for instance, to take the li fe of another person to save one's li fe. But to
my knowledge they never set a li mit to the amount of pain that woul d be
m?rally acceptable to preserve li fe. The degree of pain involved in treatment
~Ight release one fro m any obligati on to prese rve li fe . but it wo ul d not
Impose an obligation on a patient to forego treatment. It was up to th e w ishes
of the patient. So it was on the wishes of the patient that the tradi ti onal
moral approac h put the emphasis, rather than the degree of pain. Theologians
:ver argued that it woul d be immo ral to accept treatment because of the
egree of pain in volved. And the same woul d be true of gi1•ing treatme nt ,
as long as the patient wished it. A legal obligation in this regard wo uld have
no underlying moral basis .

Conclusion
re The .court ultimately overturned the decision of th e court of appea ls th at
nrnovmg
the tube fro m Ms . Conroy would be tantamo unt to tak ing her
1
e.'
~n
the
other hand. it did not fee l that th e evidence at trial was adeq uate
1
i~ satisfy the ~ubjecti ve. the limited-o bjecti ve . or the pure-objective tests
set up. But smce Ms . Conroy had already died with the tu be in situ , th ere
OVernber. 1985
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was no need for further exploratio n of the case. Looking at the
a moral perspective, we have presented several reasons to shO\'
of the tests wou ld have sat isfied moral requirements. Even if
case had passed one or the other of the tests , one wou ld not hm
to make a moral judgment about withdraw ing the tube on tl
making this statement we do not wish to imply that legal norm s sl
coincide with moral norms. In the Conroy case, we have see n
was in some respects less demanding than morality would requt
it was more demanding. But the relation between law and mo ral
larger question which we cannot enter here . Nor do we wi sh
it was immoral to withdraw the tube. Rather. from a mora l
we would judge that long-term use of a nasogastric tube n
burdensome for a patient. and therefore morally optional. If tl
for (and it seemed to be the case). it would be morally perm i'
Conroy (or her proxy following her wishes) to have the treat nll.
Our purpose was simply to show that even though passing o r
of the proposed tests wou ld have made withdrawing the tube 1
not have guaranteed its rnorality.

.s from
tt some
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l always
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r A th~ol_ogian is or ought to be concerned with the "spirit'· aspect of human
~e as

It IS implie? _in

th~

noti?n that human life is

a~

least conceivable as

~ th body and spmt. It IS eas1er , of course , to spec1fy w hat the body is,

hor one can literally take the measure of that. To speak of the human spiri t,

Are You Moving?

~~wever, requ_ires the use of the language of inference and poetry more

If the next issue of this journal should be delive re d to a differ·

dan _of quantity a nd measurement. A person's spirit is appropriate ly
escnbed with the help of such terms as aspiration , duty. gratitude,
~ndence, commitment, hope- qualities which are rather affective more
. an_q_u~?titative. The poet James Dickey speaks from and to the spiritual
senslb1ht1es when he describes "the moon lying o n the brain as on the exci ted
::so~ the strength of fields . · ' He goes on immediately , ' ' Lord, let me
pu e w.1!h purpose." ( " The strength of fields", 1977) . To "shake with
rpose refers to human spirit and its ability to mobilize one's life toward

ent address, please advise AT ONCE. The re tu rn postage
and cost of remailing this publication is beco min g more and
more costly. Your cooperation in keeping us up-to-date with
your address will be most helpful.
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